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A Roundtable Discussion of
Jay Sexton’s The Monroe Doctrine:
Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-
Century America
Alan McPherson, Jeffrey Malanson, William Weeks, and Jay Sexton
The Uses of Monroe: Review of Jay Sexton, The Monroe
Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century
America
Alan McPherson
Why revisit the Monroe Doctrine? Dexter Perkins’sThe Monroe Doctrine, published three quartersof a century ago, was a masterful three-volume
model of historical investigation that seemed to reveal
everything about President James Monroe’s 1823 statement
to Congress regarding Latin American independence.
Penned partly by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams,
Monroe’s admonition to Europe to stay out of the affairs of
newly independent American republics—and his promise
that the United States would reciprocate—was part of a
plan to secure the Americas’ independence from the Holy
Alliance. (The British shared this goal and discussed a
Monroe-type joint statement, but Adams convinced his
president to go it alone.) More ambitious was a longer-
term hegemonic project to overwhelm all Europeans as
the dominant power in the Americas.
Since Perkins, other scholars have essentially extended
this geopolitical analysis. For example, Gretchen Murphy
may have appeared not to when she explored the cultural
meanings of the doctrine in 2005. Her Hemispheric
Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S.
Empire explained how the doctrine helped create a
separate national identity for the United States and the
rest of the Americas by reflecting gender, race, and other
markers. Yet the narrative movement was projected
outward from the nation’s identity rather than inward to
embrace domestic goals.
Jay Sexton attempts something different: a long-term
review of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Essentially
he asks why it took so long for the 1823 speech to become
a “doctrine.” It was not until 1853 that the word was used,
and it was another half-century before the doctrine was
transformed from a defensive to an offensive policy. He
answers this question in terms that are largely domestic.
The Holy Alliance barely threatened the Western
Hemisphere, even in the 1820s. “A remarkable feature of
the Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century is that
Americans most often invoked it against one another” (12).
The argument is fascinating on its face, but the book’s
first two chapters offer little but the well-known story
of the U.S. desire for independence from Britain and
the difficulty of holding the nation together in the face
of westward expansion. The author is not altogether
convincing when he argues that the debate between
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and Adams over
whether or not to ally with the British in sending a
message to the Holy Alliance reflected a larger debate
about “American systems.” He believes Adams’s call
for federal development as a defense against British
encroachments suggests that it did. He is also unable to
demonstrate some of his assertions about the 1823 message
itself that make up the heart of these chapters: namely,
that its authors “sidestepped the most contentious issues”
or “avoided an explicit statement on the important issue
of territorial expansion” (60, 61). The evidence shows no
deliberate sidestepping or avoidance. He admits at times
the lack of contemporary references to Monroe’s message,
and in one instance offers the rather weak explanation
that Andrew Jackson probably “saw no need to enforce the
1823 message” (82).
Sexton establishes several themes early on, although
their ties to the Monroe Doctrine are indirect. One is
that anticolonialism and imperial expansion—seemingly
contradictory policies—were actually interdependent.
The young republic was anticolonial in that it opposed
the extension of European colonies in the new world,
and specifically the direct or indirect extension of British
power in its thirteen former colonies. This argument picks
up steam in chapter 3, where “Monroe’s declaration”
or “Monroe’s doctrine” truly entered the lexicon of U.S.
political leaders in the run-up to the Mexican War. In
the 1840s, proslavery administrations revived the 1823
message and the European threat it embodied in the
midst of campaigns to expand the U.S. empire through the
institution of slavery. Sexton plainly states, for instance,
that the Tyler administration “exaggerated the British
threat in Texas” (90). The only solution to this nonexistent
threat was the annexation of that slave state. One South
Carolinian saw this move not as hypocrisy but rather “a
precedent & noble model” for battling the abolitionist
British (91).
James Polk himself directly invoked Monroe’s warning
about British aggression against the NewWorld in an
1845 message to Congress when he advocated annexing
California, and again in 1848 when he addressed the
secession of the Yucatán Peninsula from Mexico. Calhoun
rejected Polk’s call for intervening in Mexico and, ever
the loyal South Carolinian, again brought the debate into
domestic politics by making the proslavery argument
and warning that failing to protect Texas and Cuba
from emancipation might deliver them to Europe. Polk,
a champion of slavery who “cared little about Latin
America,” thus ended up using the Monroe Doctrine to
great effect, but on domestic issues that had little to do
with securing the independence of new Latin American
republics (105). Sexton notes that Polk’s invocation of
Monroe also contradicted the intent of the 1823 message
to promote republicanism and economic liberalism.
There are many such examples of irony in the uses ofThe Sheridan Press
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the Monroe Doctrine in the decades that followed its
enunciation.
President Zachary Taylor and the Whigs also twisted
the meaning of the doctrine for political ends. They
justified the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of
1850, in which Washington and London each agreed not
to build a canal in Central America without the other’s
consent, on the theory that they had prevented British
expansionism in Latin America. Sexton rightly points out
that the deal recalled the rejected 1823 British offer of a
joint declaration.
As the Civil War approached, Stephen Douglas, as
astute a Democrat as any, condemned
Clayton-Bulwer as a Whig “negation and
repudiation” of the Monroe Doctrine
because it forestalled U.S. expansion, which
was the only true defense of republicanism
against European encroachment (127).
Countering Douglas, William Henry
Seward argued that the United States
had largely beaten back British advances
in the Great Lakes, Texas, Oregon, and
California, again focusing the debate
outside of what U.S. citizens at the time
considered to be “Latin America.” Seward
instead used Monroe to advance his vision
of internal economic development, which
would aid in the global competition with
European commerce. The disagreement over
interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine deepened the rift
between the sections in the 1850s.
During the Civil War itself, critics of Abraham Lincoln
and Seward, now secretary of state, focused on their
inability to resist British chumminess with the South and
their avoidance of confrontation with the French, who
took over Mexico. Radical Republicans joined in, moved
by their absolute opposition to European monarchical
encroachments. Again, however, there were politics
involved. An 1863 pamphlet titled The Monroe Doctrine
was published with the aim of promoting the presidential
bid of Republican Salmon Chase. For the first time,
writes Sexton, the phrase “Monroe Doctrine” “became a
nationalist symbol, a permanent feature of the political
and diplomatic landscape, during the Civil War” (153).
Between the Civil War and the War of 1898, U.S. citizens
gradually shed much of their remaining anticolonialism
and embraced “a powerful cultural internationalism,”
including a hunger for colonies beyond the territory they
had already acquired in the West (161). Here Sexton fails
to distinguish clearly between what he calls a “liberal”
internationalism and “an assertive and nationalist foreign
policy” or to explain how liberals embraced the Monroe
Doctrine (162). Nevertheless, the movement from a
defensive to an offensive doctrine accelerated.
Ulysses S. Grant made a particularly Machiavellian
use of the fear of European power when he argued
that if the United States did not annex the Dominican
Republic, some other great power would. Grant called
his (ultimately unsuccessful) plan “an adherence to
the ‘Monroe doctrine’” (165), clearly foreshadowing
Teddy Roosevelt’s justification in 1904 for what became
known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the doctrine. By
invoking the specter of European intervention, however,
interventionists such as Secretary of State Hamilton Fish
could keep claiming that the doctrine was “not a policy of
aggression . . . it does not contemplate forcible intervention
in any legitimate contest” (168). Thus U.S. political leaders
could continue to have their imperialist cake and eat it too,
claiming that their offense was still really defensive.
Secretary of State James G. Blaine was subtler about
his use of the Monroe Doctrine. To an extent, he like
his predecessors held up the hobgoblin of military
intervention from Europe. The War of the Pacific, which
endangered British railroad and mining interests in South
America, produced the lingering possibility of British
gunboats appearing in the Pacific. But Blaine saw the
Monroe Doctrine primarily as a symbol allowing him
to construct an informal U.S. version of imperialism, in
which commerce would stand in for colonialism as a way
to ward off the still-powerful commercial clout of Europe
in Latin America. Neither British investment nor the
French-planned Isthmian Canal counted as threats to the
republicanism of the hemisphere as Adams and Monroe
envisaged it in 1823. But no matter: the doctrine now had
a long history of being revived to serve
not ideals but concrete U.S. interests, and
Blaine’s ability to reinterpret it once again
spoke to its versatility.
In one of the too few instances in which
Sexton uses Latin American voices to
underscore the shifts in interpretation of
the Monroe Doctrine, he quotes Le Courrier
of Buenos Aires as saying that “the famous
Monroe Doctrine will be enlarged.” That
paper saw through Blaine’s scheming to
redefine hemispheric diplomacy: “It is not a
question of the nonintervention of Europe in
the affairs of the American continent, but of
the preponderance . . . of the United States”
(191).
The better-known invocations of the
Monroe Doctrine—Secretary of State Richard Olney’s
1895 “declaration” against the British in Venezuela and
the Roosevelt Corollary—end the volume and appear
as anticlimactic rather than dramatic reappearances of
the doctrine as they do in most narratives of nineteenth-
century U.S. foreign relations or U.S.–Latin American
relations. Sexton recounts not only the international
politics behind these two events but also the ever-present
partisanship. For example, Olney’s “twenty-inch gun”
volley was in part directed at opponents of the Grover
Cleveland administration (203). Olney’s wing of the
Democratic Party, normally cautious on foreign policy,
faced Anglophobia from some of its own populists and
an aggressive naval building zeal from Republicans.
The declaration against British advances on Venezuela
thus served to shore up the Democrats’ national security
credentials. That the U.S. Navy was gaining quickly on the
British by then also made the statement that the United
States was “practically sovereign” in the Americas more
palatable to the British.
Details also illuminate the context of the Roosevelt
Corollary. Announcing it to the Congress in December
1904, the president chose not to call his statement a
“doctrine” but rather to link it to a well-respected
tradition. That caution reflected the domestic political
troubles caused by his brash statements in favor of
intervention. For that reason he waited until after his
election to unveil his policy. As a result, the Monroe
Doctrine was now fully predicated on a view of “civilized”
versus “uncivilized” peoples and posited a proactive,
even preventive justification for intervention against often
imagined European threats. The distance traveled since
1823 had been far and tortuous.
A few caveats are in order. The book will be of less
relevance to historians of Latin America or U.S.–Latin
American relations than to those of the nineteenth-
century United States or of U.S. foreign relations more
broadly conceived. It is also not for a U.S. foreign policy
history constituency that is used to daring archival or
conceptual work. Its sources are rather traditional in
nature, mostly correspondence between U.S. statesmen
taken from published memoirs and papers. Apart from
some analysis of racism, there is little about culture or
A few caveats are in
order. The book will
be of less relevance
to historians of Latin
America or U.S.–Latin
American relations
than to those of the
nineteenth-century
United States or of U.S.
foreign relations more
broadly conceived.
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even national identity. There are also few assessments of
the Monroe Doctrine by foreigners, which is unfortunate
because some of the few statements Sexton cites from
British and Latin American observers uncover more
directly the hypocrisy of U.S. policymakers.
All in all, Sexton makes a valiant effort to pull from the
historical record instances in which key internal debates
about investment or expansion invoked, if not the very
words of the Monroe Doctrine, at least its arguments
or its logic. At times the author seems to be stretching
the argument and looking for any U.S. discussion of
European expansionism as an expression of Monroeism
without concrete evidence that Monroe was on the minds
of the discussants. There also appears to be a frustrating
unwillingness to plainly state that U.S. policymakers
were hypocritical in their application of the doctrine.
Instead, Sexton calls the obvious contradiction between
the clearly defensive statement of 1823 and the growing
interventionism of the nineteenth century a mere “uneasy
relationship” (199). Overall, the book is a valuable addition
to the literature on a topic whose evolution in the century
after 1823 remains mysterious to many.
Monroe’s Doctrine or Monroe Doctrines? A Review of
Jay Sexton’s The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in
Nineteenth-Century America
Jeffrey Malanson
In The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America, Jay Sexton offers a vital reexaminationof the creation, evolution, and many deployments of
James Monroe’s 1823 declaration of American foreign
policy principles. The book covers a lot of ground,
beginning with American independence and concluding
with some reflections on World War I, but Sexton has
balanced a thought-provoking discussion of the pertinent
issues surrounding the Monroe Doctrine in its various
iterations with a compelling and forward moving
narrative.
Historians have typically viewed the history of the
Monroe Doctrine as a series of marked
and sudden shifts in interpretation and
utilization, but Sexton masterfully teases
out the consistent factors that make the
Doctrine’s history much more one of
evolution rather than abrupt change. He
points to “three interrelated processes
central to nineteenth-century America”
that the Monroe Doctrine illuminates: “the
ongoing struggle to consolidate indepen-
dence from Britain, the forging of a new
nation, and the emergence of the Ameri-
can empire” (13). Sexton’s great contribution here lies in
the larger analytical framework within which he evaluates
these processes and the changing Doctrine through time.
Four themes within this framework stand out as meriting
special consideration and will be the focus of this review:
the relationship between international relations and do-
mestic politics; the specific framing of the Monroe Doctrine
by policymakers throughout the nineteenth century; the
connection between America’s anticolonialism and its
developing empire; and the gap between perception and
reality in Americans’ conceptions of foreign threats. It is
through his exploration of these themes (among others)
that Sexton is able to successfully and convincingly situate
the Monroe Doctrine as an integral aspect of the develop-
ment of the United States in the nineteenth century.
Sexton is not the first historian to point to the important
connections between America’s domestic politics and its
foreign policies, but he filters the history of the Monroe
Doctrine through this lens in a new way. Perhaps the
best example of this novel approach is to be found in his
treatment of the decades before the Doctrine was issued,
when public pronouncements about U.S. foreign policy
were as much concerned with preserving and strengthen-
ing the union as they were with America’s relationships
with other countries. Sexton presents George Washington’s
call in his Farewell Address to avoid foreign alliances as
stemming from his desire to minimize the exposure of
American weakness to a hostile world; it was a “means”
of national self-preservation and “not an end in itself”
(28). While Sexton could have done more to explore the
long-term impact of the Farewell Address on American
conceptions of foreign policy (Washington may have been
primarily concerned with union, but several generations
of Americans looked to it as a statement of guiding foreign
policy principles), especially in instances when it conflict-
ed with the Monroe Doctrine, his analysis is an important
demonstration of how discussions of foreign policy could
be used to address domestic concerns in substantive ways.
The same concerns for union at the heart of the Fare-
well Address also directly influenced the final shape and
message of the Monroe Doctrine. The threat of European
intervention in Latin America did not just mean the poten-
tial loss of territory in the Western Hemisphere, but also
represented a direct threat to the American union and way
of life. As a result, the United States’ warning to Europe
to leave the new Spanish American republics alone was as
much an act of self-defense as it was a statement of genu-
ine concern for the fate of its southern neighbors. Efforts to
use foreign policy to address concerns about the fragility
of the union faded over time. James K. Polk’s transforma-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine in late 1845 “from a cautious
and reactive statement of national security requirements
into a proactive call for territorial expansion” helped to
bring about the Mexican War and succeeded in inflaming
sectional tensions rather than tamping them down (102).
The real strength of Sexton’s analysis of the uses of the
Monroe Doctrine in domestic politics lies in how he ap-
plies it to the period from the Civil War to the dawn of
American empire in the mid-1890s. In this period, policy-
makers frequently discussed the Doctrine domestically but
rarely utilized it as a real tool in diplo-
macy. During the Civil War, the Doctrine
became “a nationalist symbol, a perma-
nent feature of the political and diplomatic
landscape,” and the “domestic politicking”
surrounding it “shaped howAmericans
came to understand their nation’s role in
international affairs” (153, 156). As a result
of its new symbolic status, the Doctrine
could easily be held up by politicians and
policymakers to justify their actions as an
attempt to defend Monroe’s principles. In
many cases that defense took the form of a reinterpretation
of those principles to meet modern needs and priorities.
Sexton’s focus on the malleable meanings and the political
evolution of the Monroe Doctrine in this period—when
foreign policy concerns tended not to be at the center of
American lives—helps to clarify what seemed at first to
be a dramatic shift in the meaning and utilization of the
Doctrine during the imperial boom of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
That the Monroe Doctrine could so easily and repeat-
edly be reinterpreted by generations of Americans resulted
from the way it was originally presented in 1823. Sexton
makes the point several times that the core components
of President James Monroe’s message, the doctrine of two
spheres and the non-colonization principle, were framed
in “negative terms: they stated what European powers
could not do, but dodged the question of what the United
States would do” (60-61). The Doctrine was a statement
of American ideals and not a promise of American action.
Sexton is not the first histo-
rian to point to the impor-
tant connections between
America’s domestic politics
and its foreign policies, but
he filters the history of the
Monroe Doctrine through
this lens in a new way.
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Given the wide mix of domestic and international concerns
it was meant to meet, the framing was understandable; but
this ambiguity made it easy for later policymakers to read
what they wanted to into it.
As early as 1826, President John Quincy Adams tried
to give the Doctrine more specific meaning through U.S.
participation in the Congress of Panama. He saw the
international meeting of the independent republics of
the Americas as a chance to convince them to adopt the
non-colonization principle as their own and as an oppor-
tunity to give the Doctrine a lasting legacy. If Adams had
succeeded at Panama, the Doctrine would have meant de-
fending sovereign national territory against European en-
croachment. The more problematic warning contained in
the doctrine of two spheres would have been set aside as a
foreign policy pronouncement issued to meet a specific in-
ternational challenge that had since passed.1According to
Sexton, Adams attempted to provide a “proactive comple-
ment to the negatively framed message of 1823” (74). The
problem, of course, was that he did not succeed. Congress
delayed its decision to approve the mission to Panama for
so long that the United States was unable to participate in
the congress. Sexton wisely points to this failure as an im-
portant and problematic development
in U.S. relations with Latin America,
but he does not go far enough in dis-
cussing how thoroughly the Doctrine
was set aside by the American people
in the aftermath of the Panama debate.
By the beginning of Andrew Jackson’s
presidency most Americans saw Mon-
roe’s Doctrine as a dangerous violation
of the principles expressed in Washing-
ton’s Farewell Address.
It was Polk who resurrected the
Monroe Doctrine and gave it a second
life as a bolder statement of American
interests. He took advantage of the
Doctrine’s negative framing to justify
an expansionist foreign policy, and
many of those that followed him in the
White House and State Department
made similar use of its ambiguity to meet their own needs.
It was not until the onset of American empire, though, that
policymakers began actively reframing the Doctrine’s neg-
ative principles into strictures for positive action. The best
demonstration of this was Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary
to the Monroe Doctrine, which “explicitly transformed
the negatively framed and non-interventionist message of
1823 into a proactive call for intervention” (229). Roosevelt
followed the example set by his predecessors, but he went
further than anyone else in broadening the nature and
scope of American action under the Doctrine’s auspices.
The United States’ newly acquired global power and em-
pire made this proactive foreign policy unsurprising, but it
bore little resemblance to Monroe’s declaration of 1823.
Sexton’s most important analysis deals with two seem-
ing contradictions. The first was a foreign policy dec-
laration aimed at preventing European colonization of
the Western Hemisphere being used to justify American
overseas empire. The second was a statement of principles
opposed to European intervention in Latin America being
used as the foundation for U.S. interventionism in the
same place. As Sexton concisely phrases it in his introduc-
tion, one of the most amazing features of the Monroe Doc-
trine was the “simultaneity and interdependence of antico-
lonialism and imperialism” in its evolution (5). Given their
country’s revolutionary origins, Americans looked sympa-
thetically on peoples around the world struggling to break
free from despotism and monarchy in the late-eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. One of the greatest challenges
the government faced was restraining the people in their
desire to provide aid to their revolutionary brethren in
places like France in the 1790s and Spanish America in the
1810s. While the government’s official policy was always
neutrality, this anticolonial thinking did shape certain poli-
cies, most notably the No-Transfer Principle of 1811 and
the Monroe Doctrine itself.
Even westward expansion revealed the depths of
America’s anticolonialism. Whenever new territory was
incorporated into the union as a new state, it entered on
an equal basis with those that had preceded it—a process
Sexton describes as “anticolonial colonization” (32). The
term is quite fitting. When Europeans sought to expand
their reach and control they had to look beyond their
existing borders to the wider unexplored and uncivilized
world and to colonization. When the United States wanted
to expand, it simply had to look west to lands that were
already claimed as European colonies. For the first sixty
years of American independence this anticolonial coloniza-
tion worked because there was enough open land (espe-
cially with the addition of the Louisiana Purchase) and
there were no imminent threats to continued expansion.
By the time of Polk’s presidency, though, the United States
saw potential British intervention in places like Texas and
California and felt the need to take steps
to prevent it. The anticolonial Monroe
Doctrine was the justification. As Sexton
frames it, in reasserting the Doctrine in
the first year of his presidency “Polk
made the case for an imperialist for-
eign policy on the hardheaded grounds
of preemptive expansion justified by
national security” (99). The result was
the annexation of the southwest quarter
of the United States and the eventual
incorporation of that territory through
anticolonial colonization.
The Civil War was a turning point
for the Monroe Doctrine’s status as an
anticolonial document. With the federal
government resorting to forceful inter-
vention in the affairs of its own states,
many began to question why it should
not intervene in the affairs of other countries to block
European intervention. This idea of pursuing intervention
to uphold the principle of non-intervention was first raised
by Polk in 1848 over the Mexican province of Yucatan and
again by Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth during
his 1851–2 tour of the United States; however, in both cases
it had been rejected by the American people. The Civil War
experience forever changed the American perspective on
the question. It would take several decades for Americans
to embrace fully the idea, or for American power to match
American ideals, but the strange linking of anticolonial-
ism and interventionism—and eventually imperialism—
began to take concrete shape in this period. Whether it was
President Ulysses S. Grant’s call for the annexation of the
Dominican Republic in 1870 in an attempt to “mobilize
anticolonial sentiment on behalf of an imperialist venture,”
or the Republicans’ “creative rereading” of the Doctrine
to prevent European “commercial interference” in Latin
America in the 1880s, the Doctrine was increasingly being
mobilized in ways that were antithetical to its original
intent (165, 180). With the arrival of America’s imperial
future in 1898 with the Spanish-American War, the Doc-
trine had been transformed: it “continued to represent a
prohibition on European intervention, but it also became
increasingly associated with new and proactive policies
within the hemisphere” (185).
The conclusion of the Spanish-American War witnessed
the “wedding of nationalism and internationalism,” which
only served to broaden “the appeal of the Monroe Doc-
trine” (217). This long process culminated in 1904 with the
Sexton’s most important
analysis deals with two seem-
ing contradictions. The first
was a foreign policy declaration
aimed at preventing European
colonization of the Western
Hemisphere being used to jus-
tify American overseas empire.
The second was a statement of
principles opposed to European
intervention in Latin America
being used as the foundation for
U.S. interventionism in the same
place.
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Roosevelt Corollary, which established the United States
as a police power in the Western Hemisphere. In declar-
ing such a role for his country, Roosevelt had “explicitly
transformed the negatively framed and non-intervention-
ist message of 1823 into a proactive call for intervention”
and “used an anticolonial symbol to extend legitimacy to
an interventionist foreign policy” (229, 239). Herein lay the
“great paradox of the Monroe Doctrine: its anticolonial-
ism and idealism—its enlightened call for a new world
order premised upon nonintervention, republican self-
government, and an open world economy— justified and
empowered an imperialist role for the United States in
international affairs” (248). Such a conclusion seems too
contradictory to be true, but it was the natural outgrowth
of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine and American
foreign policy.
The Doctrine in all its forms was premised on the idea of
a European threat to the United States or to the American
System. Some of Sexton’s most persua-
sive evidence examines the gap between
perception and reality in Americans’
conceptions of these foreign threats. This
problem of perception was ingrained
into America’s sense of self from the
moment the country declared its inde-
pendence. Sexton rightfully notes that
“American statesmen viewed interna-
tional affairs through an ideological
lens that presupposed rivalry between
republics and monarchies” and set the
United States perpetually at odds with
the powers of Europe (11). Given how frequently the
United States bounced back and forth between hostilities
with Great Britain and France until the end of the War of
1812, the perception of an almost constant European threat
was understandable.
The extended period of peace that followed the war did
not diminish American sensitivities, though. A reading of
John Quincy Adams’s diary in the month leading up to
the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine makes it clear that
multiple members of the cabinet (most notably Secretary
of War John C. Calhoun) were entirely motivated by their
tremendous fears of European intervention and of Brit-
ain’s naval power. Adams’s pragmatic assessment of the
largely non-existent European threat won the day and led
to the publication of a declaration of American principles
that was carefully crafted and moderate in tone, but it
did nothing to curb future overreactions. The view of the
British abolitionist and colonization threat in Texas and
California in the 1830s and 1840s is a prime example of this
problem of threat perception at work. The fear that Britain
would take action in the West or that that action would
dramatically undermine the United States was overstated,
but it enabled Polk to assert the Monroe Doctrine to justify
a preemptive foreign policy. Sexton stresses that this was
not simply a case of overreaction, but that “fixed policy
objectives,” in this case the acquisition of California,
“dictated [Polk’s] threat perception” (101). Polk wanted
California, and any rumblings that Britain might also have
its eye on the region signified a grave threat to American
interests and security. “It was in this context that Polk
invented ‘Monroe’s Doctrine’ in late 1845” (102).
The overstated British threat lingered throughout the
nineteenth century, but starting in the 1880s American
policymakers “developed a newly heightened percep-
tion of threat.” They feared that the ongoing scramble
for Africa would “spill over into Latin America and the
Caribbean” and also worried that the “rising nations of
Latin America” could pose a threat to U.S. dominance in
the Western Hemisphere (176). These concerns persisted in
the last quarter of the century even as administrations and
policies changed. Sexton does a nice job of highlighting
how much U.S. policymakers struggled with negotiating
relations with Latin America in this period. By the dawn
of the twentieth century the British threat had been re-
placed by a German one that was not completely unfound-
ed but was also significantly overstated. Teddy Roosevelt’s
response to this new threat was a much more proactive
foreign policy. As Sexton phrases it, a “cocktail of threat
perception and international ambition laid the foundation
for the Roosevelt Corollary” (226). Issued in response to
this new European threat, the Corollary “was a statement
of a self-confident nation concerned more with the great
game of imperial rivalry than with the internal dynamics
of its once fragile union of states” (239). The nation’s and
Roosevelt’s proverbial “big stick” only grew bigger as the
nation matured and as its ambitions and conception of
foreign threats expanded.
The overstatement of foreign threats from Polk through
Roosevelt was often born out of strategic utility. This idea
serves as a fitting way to make sense of
the place that the Doctrine holds in the
history of American foreign policy. John
Quincy Adams saw the international
situation at the end of 1823 as the ideal
time to declare American principles to
the world, but he and Monroe did so
without clearly stating what the United
States would do if those principles were
violated. This negative frame enabled
subsequent generations of policymakers
to uphold the Monroe Doctrine as a vital
statement of American principles while
simultaneously utilizing it in the ways that best fit their
needs. Whether that was as a political tool, as a defense
against foreign threats, or as a justification for imperial-
ist action, over the course of the nineteenth century the
Doctrine became a one-size-fits-all pronouncement of
foreign policy ideals. Sexton is spot-on in his conclusion
that “there were as many Monroe Doctrines as there were
perspectives on nineteenth-century statecraft” (246). In
the final analysis, Jay Sexton’s The Monroe Doctrine is an
extremely valuable and necessary reconsideration of the
Monroe Doctrine and its impact on nineteenth-century
America.
Notes:
1. The best and most easily accessible evidence of Adams’s in-
tentions at Panama is Secretary of State Henry Clay’s mission
instructions, which can be found in The Papers of Henry Clay, ed.
James F. Hopkins, 10 vols. (Lexington, KY, 1959-91), 5:313-44.
Roundtable comment on Jay Sexton’s The Monroe
Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century
America
William Earl Weeks
Jay Sexton is a young historian who has alreadyproduced an impressive body of work on the still-neglected field of nineteenth-century American foreign
relations. His current offering, The Monroe Doctrine:
Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America, takes a
fresh look at the Monroe Doctrine as a key ideological
foundation stone in the construction of an American
global empire. As the title suggests, the book posits an
organic connection between the American nation and the
American Empire, framing them as mutually reinforcing
phenomenon that evolved in parallel even as each was
fiercely contested. Construction of an expansionist
American Empire was both a precondition and raison d’être
for the construction of an American nation, and “Monroe’s
Doctrine,” as President Polk first termed it, appeared to
function as a point of consensus: all Americans, whatever
Given how frequently the
United States bounced back
and forth between hostilities
with Great Britain and France
until the end of the War of
1812, the perception of an al-
most constant European threat
was understandable.
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their section or party, could agree that future foreign
intervention and colonization in the Western Hemisphere
was a no-no. Over time politicians competed to show who
had the greatest fidelity to these bedrock principles, using
their presumed stronger adherence to them as a club to
beat down political opponents.
Sexton narrates the evolution of Monroe’s principles
from a lightly regarded statement in the president’s annual
message to Congress to the status of a commandment in
the church of American nationalism in a series of artfully
constructed chapters, the last of which deals with Teddy
Roosevelt’s Corollary of 1904. The author’s strong grasp
of the history of the entire century, combined with a
clear and confident writing style, makes for an enjoyable
and intellectually stimulating read. Each chapter stands
on its own as a perceptive analysis of the period with
which it deals. The contested nature of the meaning
and application of the Doctrine is the unifying thread:
“There were as many Monroe Doctrines as there were
perspectives on nineteenth-century statecraft” (246). The
division between pro-slavery and anti-slavery versions
of the Monroe Doctrine was perhaps the most significant
political fault line in this regard. Yet in spite of the
diversity of opinions on its meaning and application,
a solid majority of Americans backed its implicit claim
to hemispheric dominance. “Premised upon a curious
mixture of imperial ambitions and perceptions of internal
vulnerability, the national security of the United States
required more than just the safety of its borders—it
required an entire hemispheric system conducive to its
political system and economic practices” (60).
In this reader’s view, the strongest chapter is on the
1860s, appropriately entitled “Civil Wars.” Sexton places
the war in the context of the “dual crises”
of the decade in the United States and
Mexico, as both nations sought to resolve
internal conflicts without precipitating
foreign intervention, unsuccessfully
in the case of Mexico. He emphasizes
that an independent Confederate States
of America represented the ultimate
threat to the Monroe Doctrine. The
Confederacy schemed to ally itself with
a European power even as the crisis
it had spawned diverted American
attention from France’s incursion into
Mexico. Although the term “Monroe
Doctrine”was never publicly used by
the Lincoln administration, which was
wary of incurring criticism for failing
to apply it stringently enough, by the 1860s the Doctrine
had “attained the status of national dogma” and the term
and the principles it symbolized had become “entrenched
in the American vocabulary, appearing for the first time
without the possessive and often as a proper noun with
both words capitalized” (123-24). Indeed, the conquest
of the South was as much about crushing a would-be
hemispheric rival as it was about preserving the Union,
an underappreciated fact that places the conflict in its
rightful international frame as a foreign war. Lincoln’s
and Secretary of State Seward’s vigorous assertion of the
Monroe Doctrine in their conduct of the war is no less
significant for being implicit rather than formally stated.
Sexton emphasizes “the simultaneity and
interdependence of anticolonialism and imperialism”
(5), with the British Empire paradoxically serving
as a model to be feared as well as emulated. Even as
Americans desperately sought to separate themselves
ideologically from their former colonial masters, they
were creating a new form of empire heavily reliant upon
British commerce, investment, and military power.
Certainly one of the great strengths of the book is that,
somewhat inadvertently, it elaborates the ways in which
Anglo-American imperialism after 1823 was a single
entity, at least when viewed from a certain perspective.
Notwithstanding the high-profile controversies that
marked U.S. relations with Great Britain throughout the
nineteenth century, an emerging body of scholarship
is sketching the outlines of a de facto imperial alliance
between the two states. As Bernard Porter has observed,
“most serious historians today, on both sides of the
Atlantic, acknowledge America’s ‘imperialist’ past, though
they might not realize how precisely similar to Britain’s
many aspects of it were. In the earlier nineteenth century
one can see British and American ‘colonisation’ following
the same path almost exactly.” 1 The correctness of this
view traditionally has been obscured by the tendency to
characterize the American conquest of a large part of the
North American continent and the de facto colonization
of the hemisphere as “not imperialism.” The Monroe
Doctrine in this respect functions as a first principle not
subject to debate that enabled the United States to develop
a “hands-on” policy for the Western Hemisphere, thereby
obscuring its fundamentally imperial aspect. Perhaps
what is needed now is an Anglo-American imperial school
dedicated to revealing the commonalities between the
two expansionist states, which scholars too often see in
opposition to one another. In this regard Sexton notes
“imperial influence in the nineteenth century was not
unidirectional” (246).
I have two quibbles with Sexton’s otherwise fine book.
The first concerns his failure to incorporate the concept
of union into his analysis of the relation between nation
and empire. Union has long been a ubiquitous yet
paradoxically near-invisible concept in American history
generally and foreign relations history
particularly. It is most often taken for
granted and seen as synonymous with
nation, even as everyone recognizes that
the political union created in 1776 did not
automatically result in the creation of a
nation. That was a much more arduous
project; Sexton suggests that it was
complete by the end of the nineteenth
century, while others might see it as
incomplete even today. In any case, it
is the concept of a durable, permanent
political union that connects the pre-
existing expansionist tendency to the
voluble collectivity known as the nation.
Sexton makes minimal mention of the
distinct role of union, as evidenced by
the fact that while “nationalism” appears in the index,
“union” does not. Indeed, the notion of a permanent
union is itself a sort of internal Monroe Doctrine, a mostly
unspoken first principle aimed at preventing the security
threats of intervention and colonization from occurring
domestically. It is in this respect that the dual nature of the
Civil War as both an internal rebellion and foreign war is
revealed. It was a war to save the Union as well as a war to
assert the Monroe Doctrine.
My second quibble concerns the role of British and
American military power in the making of the Monroe
Doctrine. Sexton, like most historians of the topic, argues
“the 1823 message itself accomplished nothing. It was
British statecraft, not Monroe’s message, that achieved the
immediate objectives of 1823.” He minimizes American
military power as a meaningful factor in the hemispheric
balance of power: “It was British naval power and
diplomacy, combined with the power of the states of Latin
America, that prevented the recolonization of territories in
the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century” (244).
He dismisses John Quincy Adams’s later claim that the
Doctrine also functioned as a warning to Great Britain not
I have two quibbles with
Sexton’s otherwise fine
book. The first concerns
his failure to incorporate
the concept of union into
his analysis of the relation
between nation and
empire... My second quibble
concerns the role of British
and American military
power in the making of the
Monroe Doctrine.
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to intervene in the hemisphere as “akin to the hitchhiker
dictating directions to the driver” (53).
While Sexton is echoing the scholarly consensus on this
point, I believe it is off the mark. The genius of Adams’s
statesmanship (mostly attributable to his talent and long
experience as a judge of geo-strategic reality) resided in
his correct assessment of the relative power, geographic
position, and national interests of the United States
vis à vis Great Britain and the other European powers.
Certainly Adams recognized that in absolute terms,
American military power was no match for Great Britain’s.
Yet he also understood far sooner and more profoundly
than anyone else how dramatically British policy had
shifted from supporting the restoration of monarchy
during the Napoleonic Era to espousing open markets
and liberal capitalism. He had seen this evolution during
the course of the post–1815 U.S. rapprochement with
the British and alone among the American policy elite
understood that a formal alliance would not be needed
to get them to pursue their own self-interest in opposing
further European intervention in the hemisphere. At
the same time Adams, perhaps owing to his long years
abroad as a diplomat, also understood that without
British support the chance of a major European military
intervention in the hemisphere was nil. Napoleon’s
disastrous expedition to reconquer Sainte Domingue had
proven that the NewWorld could be a graveyard for Old
World armies, even ones as capable as that of Napoleonic
France. The Holy Allies, who I believe it is fair to say
were more sentiment than substance as a unified force,
lacked the capacity effectively to project power across the
Atlantic Ocean and throughout the extensive landmass
of the Americas. Adams made this point most famously
when he said that he no more believed that the Holy Allies
would “restore the Spanish dominion upon the American
continent than that Chimborazo will sink beneath the
ocean” (52). That the Polignac Memorandum, in which
Canning received a pledge from the other European states
not to intervene in Spanish America, was made some
months before Monroe issued his pronouncement merely
confirms Adams’s insights. Secure in the knowledge of
British interests and European impotence, Adams could
argue for an independent American policy. The Monroe
Doctrine did not need the support of British military
power to be effective; it needed only the certainty that
British power would not be deployed. This, to me, is
a critical distinction. So Sexton is but half right when
he concludes that “the course of action pursued by the
Monroe administration advanced American interests
and principles at minimal cost. The 1823 message
shrewdly exposed British power, which Adams hedged
would be deployed against the Holy Allies in the case of
intervention, without signing up to the restrictive terms
of Canning’s offer” (53). Adams did not count on British
power being used to stop an invasion. Rather, he counted
on the Holy Allies’ inability to mount an invasion without
it.
The net result of the Monroe and Adams handiwork was
a post–1823 world in which a de facto Anglo-American
condominium had been established in the Western
Hemisphere. The centuries-long multilateral European
imperial competition for dominance in the region had
effectively been reduced to two players, Great Britain and
the United States, and the latter owed its existence in part
to the expansionist impulse. The two states could now
engage in what Sexton terms the “collaborative conquest”
of Latin America, cooperating and competing as specific
circumstances dictated.
Yet I believe Sexton underestimates U.S. military power
in evaluating pre–Civil War Anglo-American relations.
British military power was great and increasing after
1820, far surpassing the standing armies and navies of the
United States. But a one-to-one comparison ignores the
huge role a favorable geographic position played for the
United States in balancing British power, at least as far
south as Panama. By the 1820s, no candid observer could
doubt the Americans’ remarkable capacity, whatever
the current state of preparedness of their forces, to
successively take on the mightiest powers in the world. On
the high seas, the American navy had bested the French
in the Quasi-War of 1798 and had dueled the Royal Navy
to a draw during the War of 1812. On land, the rag-tag
American revolutionary forces had bested the British (with
French help). Historians tend to view the War of 1812 as
a draw, but in doing so they overlook the fact that the
last three important engagements of the war—on Lake
Champlain, at Baltimore, and at New Orleans—were
major American victories. The fact that the victory at
New Orleans occurred after the treaty had already been
inked and thus in some sense was moot did not lessen its
significance as a crushing defeat for a British NewWorld
invasion force.
The Anglo-American NewWorld condominium erected
in the 1820s did not function in a steady state. Over
the course of the century, the United States slowly and
steadily gained the upper hand in the relationship as a
result of its rising economic and military strength, the
advantages of a favorable geography, and the fact that
while the Americas were but one part of an evolving
British global empire, they constituted the United States’
“backyard,” the core of its foreign policy interest. When
push literally threatened to come to shove, as in Oregon,
the British consistently calculated that their interests in the
region were too peripheral to warrant the risk of a third
Anglo-American war. This calculation also prevailed in
Texas, as Sexton acknowledges: “For all their interest in an
independent, anti-slavery Texas, British statesmen never
were prepared to risk provoking the United States through
an interventionist policy aimed at that end” (91). By the
1850s the British were backpedaling in Central America
as well, in spite of outrageous U.S. provocations such as
the 1854 leveling of the village of Greytown by American
naval vessels.
Sexton ends his work in the early twentieth century,
the century in which the Monroe Doctrine would be
applied reflexively and repeatedly. It then functioned
as received wisdom for policymakers and critics, its
nineteenth-century origins mostly obscured or forgotten.
Sexton’s sure hand makes the reader eager to see a second
volume dealing with the Doctrine’s twentieth-century
evolution, for he has produced what is, in my view, the
most perceptive assessment of the Monroe Doctrine’s early
decades yet written. A second volume seems a logical step.
But my hope is that he continues to apply his considerable
skills as a historian to the long-fallow field of nineteenth-
century American foreign relations.
Notes:
1. Bernard Porter, Empire and Superempire: Britain, America, and the
World (New Haven, 2006), 91.
Author’s Response
Jay Sexton
Iwould like to thank Jeffrey Malanson, Alan McPherson,and William Earl Weeks for their constructivecomments in this exchange, and Andrew Johns
for doing such a great job of bringing it to print. I am
fortunate to have the opportunity to engage with these
colleagues.
I chose to write about the Monroe Doctrine because
it provides a fresh prism through which to view
nineteenth-century U.S. statecraft. The story of the
Doctrine’s evolution is not a linear one. The Doctrine was
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a slippery and shape-shifting symbol whose meaning
and application varied widely. Invocations of it reflected,
as well as produced, domestic political conflict, not to
mention diplomatic controversy. Changes in the Doctrine
over time reveal not only the imperial march of the United
States, but also the variety of perspectives regarding the
international role of the American union that can be found
in the nineteenth century. Most often invoked in domestic
political contexts, the Doctrine forces us to consider
together the domestic and foreign aspects of U.S. history,
which we scholars are often too quick to treat separately.
In the bigger picture, the Doctrine provides a means of
thinking about the interrelated, geopolitical processes of
nineteenth-century U.S. history: the ongoing struggle to
consolidate independence from Britain,
the contested and violent process of
national consolidation within the union,
and imperial expansion and the projection
of U.S. power beyond its borders.
As the above paragraph no doubt
makes clear, the very characteristics that
make the Doctrine interesting are also
the ones that make writing a coherent
book about it difficult. I am thus very
pleased that the reviewers, particularly
Malanson and Weeks, are convinced by
the overall argument and framework that
ties the book together. Malanson’s first paragraph neatly
sums it up, more succinctly than I could do here. Most
pleasing of all are the comments Weeks makes concerning
the British angle that is so central to the book. I am glad
that this part of my argument did not fall through the
cracks. I could not agree more when Weeks makes the
case for thinking about Anglo-American imperialism
as a joint phenomenon. This is the direction in which
scholars on this side of the Atlantic, in Britain, are moving.
Indeed, with “American exceptionalism” now rightly
in the dustbin, SHAFR scholars might find it useful to
view nineteenth-century America in relation to a global
economic and imperial system conditioned by British
power.
The central challenge facing nineteenth-century U.S.
statesmen was how to consolidate their decentralized
union, which existed in what they imagined to be a
hostile geopolitical environment. In the book I use the
rather old-fashioned word “statecraft” because, unlike
“foreign policy,” it looks both inward and outward, as
did the “statesmen” of the nineteenth century. American
diplomacy, in other words, was inextricably intertwined
with the internal politics of the union. The expanding
conception of nineteenth-century U.S. national security
derived more from perceptions of the internal fragility of
the union than from calculations of the power of foreign
rivals. The concept of union, in short, is central to my
argument—and here I am picking up on the work of a
number of scholars, including David Hendrickson, James
Lewis, Peter Onuf, and Weeks himself, who cogently
examines this theme in his various writings. Perhaps it is
the very ubiquity of union that paradoxically explains its
absence from the index.
The synergy between the internal dynamics of the union
and the construction of foreign policy lies at the heart of
the message of 1823, the textual basis for what became
the Monroe Doctrine. McPherson has misunderstood
my argument on the difference between Calhoun and
Adams: I see their disagreement in 1823 as arising out
of different conceptions of what most threatened the
unity of the union. Calhoun feared that a European
intervention in Latin America would trigger an ideological
confrontation within the union. Adams, in contrast,
feared that the bold foreign policy called for by Calhoun
might result in a war with European powers that would
necessitate the concentration of federal power to such
an extent that it could trigger a 1776-style, anti-imperial
rebellion from within the union. The story of the drafting
of the 1823 message is complex, not least because it was
wrapped up with the issue of a potential alliance with
the hated British, as Weeks rightly emphasizes. Drafting
the 1823 message required compromise between the
various perspectives offered by cabinet members. And
the final draft of the message did reveal that the Monroe
team postponed a decision on two key issues: first, what
the United States would do if the Holy Allies ignored
Monroe and intervened in Latin America; and, second, the
administration’s plans for Texas and Cuba, two territories
coveted by expansionists like Adams. These issues
were discussed at length in November
1823, but the cabinet did not come to a
resolution on them and avoided explicit
discussion of them in the final draft of
the 1823 message. Monroe’s 1823 message
thus can be said to have sidestepped
these two issues.
One of the challenges in writing
a history of the Monroe Doctrine is
constructing a narrative of an ever-
changing symbol that is difficult to pin
down. Furthermore, as Malanson and
McPherson rightly point out, there were
times— particularly in the 1830s—when Americans barely
mentioned the Doctrine (or the 1823 message, as it then
would have been called). Dexter Perkins, who wrote a
masterful trilogy on the Doctrine in the early twentieth
century, dealt with this problem, more or less, by fast-
forwarding through the drought years to arrive at the
next episode in which the Doctrine appeared. I chose the
alternative of searching for connections in U.S. thought
and policy across time, for what is most important in my
view is not the narrowly defined history of the Doctrine,
but the larger attitudes and policies Americans attached
to it.
Thus, the book briefly examines Andrew Jackson’s
domestic, foreign, and Indian policies as a means of
setting the stage for James K. Polk, whose creation of
“Monroe’s doctrine” in 1845 owed more to Old Hickory
than it did to Monroe or Adams. McPherson is critical of
the section on Jackson, but he flattens the argument that
is offered in the book. There are three reasons Jackson did
not speak of or invoke the 1823 message: first, it was then
a symbol associated with his political enemies Adams and
Clay; second, the Jackson administration saw commercial
benefit in British control of the Malvinas/Falkland
Islands; and, third, the policies associated with the 1823
message after the Panama Congress (namely, hemispheric
cooperation) had little appeal to Jackson, whose agenda
was the unilateral pursuit of North American hegemony.
Weeks raises an important point concerning the
significance of U.S. military power in the pre-1861 era. I
am keen to read more from him in the future on this issue.
Though the book does not emphasize British perceptions
of U.S. military power, it certainly acknowledges that
Britain’s gradual retreat from North and Central America
owed much to the lessons of 1776 and 1812. There was
little enthusiasm in Britain for pursuing costly policies
that had little chance of containing American expansion.
Fighting the Americans, a Victorian once said, would be
like breaking your neighbor’s windows with gold coins. It
was better for the British to outsource the job of imperial
expansion in North America and reap the economic
benefits of an expanding United States without incurring
the overhead costs of imperial wars and administration.
Yet Britain’s gradual retreat from North America was
not simply a reaction to U.S. military power but also
reflected innovations in imperial thought and strategy.
The central challenge
facing nineteenth-century
U.S. statesmen was how
to consolidate their
decentralized union,
which existed in what they
imagined to be a hostile
geopolitical environment.
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One way to illustrate this point is to place Britain’s U.S.
policy in a broader context. A comparable process was at
work, for example, in Britain’s dealings with Argentina.
The failed expeditions to colonize Río de la Plata in 1806-7
influenced Britain’s Latin American policy in much the
same way the War of 1812 affected its U.S. policy. The
high costs and low rewards of a policy of all-out conquest
highlighted the advantages of a
program of “informal imperialism”
involving commercial expansion
and collaboration with local elites.
This, of course, is the famous
“informal if possible, formal if
necessary” argument put forth
by Robinson and Gallagher.1 The
comparison with Argentine policy,
however, gives some grist to Weeks’
mill: if the British felt able to seize
the Malvinas/Falklands from Buenos Aires, they certainly
did not feel able to wrest Texas away from the Americans
a decade later. Again, I would agree that the potential
military power of the United States—combined with the
unpopularity of a costly third American war at home
in Britain—was on the minds of British policymakers.
But I would suggest that the issue of military power be
incorporated into a broader interpretation of the evolution
of British imperial strategy in the Americas in the early
and mid-nineteenth century.
McPherson suggests that The Monroe Doctrine is of
more value to those interested in U.S. foreign relations in
general than to experts of U.S.–Latin American relations.
He wants more on the hypocrisy of U.S. statesmen. This
issue, however, is explicitly discussed in several places
in the book.2 But I agree with the bigger point that many
more stories of Latin American resistance to the United
States remain to be examined, as do a surprising number
of counter-episodes in which mid-nineteenth-century
Latin American liberals such as Sarmiento and Romero
embraced what they viewed as the enlightened potential
of the Monroe Doctrine.3 Like the tangle of Anglophobia/
Anglophilia in nineteenth-century U.S. politics, images
of the United States in Latin America ran the gamut from
virulent Yankeephobia to a liberal embrace of North
American institutions.4
If hemispheric responses to U.S. power are not the
central theme of the book, a sub-theme running through
it concerns how Latin Americans became increasingly
adept at appropriating the Monroe Doctrine and
exploiting Yankee insecurities in order to achieve their
own objectives. One common strategy was to seek U.S.
assistance during violations of the 1823 message, as
Mexican liberals sought to do during the 1860s. In other
instances, such as Yucatan in the 1840s, Latin American
statesmen overstated the European threat or even invited
foreign intervention as a means of coaxing the United
States into certain actions. Toward the end of the century,
Latin Americans such as Luis María Drago re-imagined
the Monroe Doctrine as a symbol of non-intervention and
hemispheric cooperation to advance an internationalist
and legalistic agenda. The book argues that Latin
Americans played a crucial role in the formation of the
Monroe Doctrine.
A final challenge in writing about the Doctrine is the
imperative of avoiding the anachronism that so easily
slips into studies of nineteenth-century America. One
must not project the twentieth-century Monroe Doctrine
back into the nineteenth century. The factious nineteenth-
century union was not the singular nation of later times;
nor was the United States the hegemonic global power
that it would become. The “Monroe Doctrine” did not
even exist until the mid-nineteenth century, and even then
it could not be said to have determined U.S. policy. Nor
would it have been recognized by most Latin Americans
until the final decades of the nineteenth century. If we set
out only to find the antecedents to twentieth-century anti-
Americanism, we risk flattening the range of responses to
the Doctrine that can be found in Latin America, Europe,
and the wider world. In short, we must bear in mind that
the Doctrine meant different things in the nineteenth-
century world than in the
subsequent “American century.”
The Monroe Doctrine—and I am
speaking of it now as the versatile
political symbol imagined in the
United States —helps us locate the
origins of American imperialism in
the internal dynamics and political
culture of the nineteenth-century
union. The book seeks to explain
how an anticolonial symbol
became the script for imperial expansion. The history
of the Doctrine illuminates the internal origins of U.S.
imperialism by casting light on a domestic political system
and culture that, though anti-imperial in Anglophobic
and anti-monarchical respects, nonetheless incubated a
powerful nationalism that produced expansionist and
imperialist foreign policies. The political scramble to claim
the nationalist Monroe Doctrine at home narrowed the
policy options available to statesmen in Washington as
the nineteenth century progressed. The story of the rise
of American imperialism in this period, of course, is also
geopolitical: the ongoing competition against the British,
combined with the union-building project at home, led
U.S. statesmen to pursue outward-looking and assertive
policies. This is the synergy between anticolonialism and
imperialism that William Appleman Williams so rightly
pointed to long ago.5
The Monroe Doctrine, in short, helps us see nineteenth-
century U.S. statecraft and imperialism in new ways.
It tells us a story that is different from (although not
incompatible with) the story that emerges when we
look at Manifest Destiny, which highlights the racial
and ideological origins of U.S. imperialism, or the Open
Door, which illuminates its economic roots. The Monroe
Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, the Open Door . . . all that
remains to be discussed is the Farewell Address, which
Malanson brings up. But I will leave that one to him, as
tracing it over time would no doubt tell a different story
still.
Notes:
1. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of
Free Trade,” The Economic History Review, Second series, Vol. VI,
no. 1 (1953), 1-15.
2. Pages 72, 178, and 191 examine why Latin Americans saw
“hypocrisy” in the words and actions of the United States. The
theme is further explored elsewhere, albeit without using the
specific word “hypocrisy.”
3. Sarmiento and Romero are examined in Chapter 4. For Latin
American resistance to U.S. invocations of the Monroe Doctrine,
see pp. 69-73, 110-11, 170, 189-97, 209, 228, 235-7, 247.
4. My view here is shaped by the “Images of America” project
at University College London, particularly the work of Nicola
Miller and Natalia Bas.
5. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American
Diplomacy (New York, 1972), pp. 18-58.
Like the tangle of Anglophobia/
Anglophilia in nineteenth-century U.S.
politics, images of the United States
in Latin America ran the gamut from
virulent Yankeephobia to a liberal
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